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THE IMPARTIAL JUDGE:
DETACHMENT OR PASSION?
Jeffrey M. Shaman*
[Judges] do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we
shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do.
The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn
aside in their course, and pass the judges by.'
I. INTRODUCrION
In our legal system, judicial impartiality is a fundamental compo-
nent of justice. We expect our judges to be, above all else, impartial
arbiters so that legal disputes are decided according to the law free
from the influence of bias or prejudice. The principle of judicial im-
partiality is dictated by statutory and common law,2 is required by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, 3 and is essential to due process of law.
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say, as did the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, that "It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as
impartial as the lot of humanity will admit.'"4
Like many other fundamental principles, however, this one is not
always easy to translate into specific application. Pure impartiality is
an ideal that can never be completely attained. Judges, after all, are
human beings who come to the bench with feelings, knowledge, and
beliefs that cannot be magically extirpated. They may have prior
knowledge about evidentiary matters in a case, or strong beliefs about
legal issues they must decide. They may have feelings about the attor-
neys, parties, or witnesses who appear before them. Furthermore,
judges engage in extrajudicial activities that may affect their ability to
be impartial. 5 They have relatives and friends who may appear before
* Wicklander Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law; Senior Fellow, American Judicature
Society. The author is grateful to Jodi M. Solovy who provided excellent research and editing
assistance for this article.
1. BENJAMIN J. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
2. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS passim (1990).
3. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
4. In re Mussman, 302 A.2d 822, 824 (N.H. 1973) (citing N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35) (emphasis
added).
5. For example, some extrajudicial activities identified in the Model Code include speaking
engagements, written commentary, participation in charitable or civic groups and related activi-
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them in court. They participate in civic, charitable, and business activ-
ities that may create conflicts of interests. In sum, judges do not live
in ivory towers and are not immune to the foibles of the human condi-
tion. Nonetheless, we demand that they adhere to the highest degree
of impartiality that is mortally possible.6
II. THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
In the United States, judges are governed by the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which traces its roots to the Canons of Judicial Ethics origi-
nally set forth by the American Bar Association in 1924. 7 The 1924
Canons, which were drafted by a committee headed by Supreme
Court Chief Justice William Howard Taft, were intended to be an
ideal guide of behavior rather than an enforceable set of rules.8 De-
spite their precatory intent, the Canons were officially adopted for use
by a number of states, although they were rarely enforced.9 The Ca-
nons have been criticized for their emphasis on "moral posturing" that
proved to be more "hortatory than helpful in providing firm guidance
for the solution of difficult questions."'10 Moreover, the 1924 Canons
reflected the traditional view of the judicial function. That is, they
envisioned the ideal judge as one who dispensed justice in a mechani-
cal, detached way. Canon 20 proclaimed:
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general
law to particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not
of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under
such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider
substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law
as he knows it to be binding on him .... He should administer his
office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power,
but a judge under the sanction of law.1
ties, financial and business dealings, and other activities outside a judge's official duties. See
MODEL CODE Canon 4.
6. See, e.g., MODEL CODE Canon 3E cmt. (stressing the importance of judicial impartiality by
requiring disqualification in a proceeding "whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned").
7. Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410.
8. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924) for a statement from the Preamble regarding orig-
inal intent: "The [American Bar] Association accordingly adopts the following Canons, the
spirit of which it suggests as a proper guide and reminder for judges, and as indicating what the
people have a right to expect from them."
9. See Martineau, supra note 7 and accompanying text (commenting that based on the Ca-
nons' suggestive versus regulatory nature, the states adopted what the ABA originally intended,
that is, guidelines for judicial conduct).
10. Robert B. McKay, Judges, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Nonjudicial Activities, 1972
UTAH L. REV. 391.
11. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1924).
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Thus, justice was seen as an impersonal system, a system of "law not
of men."'1 2 A judge was expected to apply general legal principles and
to eschew any personal view of justice. Indeed, the judge's personal
belief was considered arbitrary and a thing apart from the law.
The next Canon, Canon 21, was entitled "Idiosyncrasies and Incon-
sistencies," and included the following statement:
Justice should not be moulded by the individual idiosyncrasies of
those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and ex-
pected method of doing justice, and not seek to be extreme or pecu-
liar in his judgments, or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of
the court.13
No doubt, there is some sound advice in Canon 21. Certainly it is
best for a judge to avoid being "peculiar" or even "idiosyncratic,"
although perhaps being "spectacular" or "sensational" once in a great
while might not be so contemptible. According to Canon 21, how-
ever, a judge should be neither individualistic nor extreme; passion
and zeal are best avoided in the ideal judge. 14
In 1972, the ABA substantially rewrote the Canons and gave them a
new name, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 15 Then, in 1990, the
ABA revised the Model Code, amending some specific details and ad-
ding others, while maintaining its basic standards.16 Unlike their
predecessor, both the 1972 and 1990 Codes were designed to be
mandatory and enforceable. 17
Some version of the Code of Judicial Conduct has been officially
adopted in forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
court system.' 8 Only Montana and Wisconsin remain as hold-outs in
adopting the Code, although those two states have adopted their own
rules of conduct for judges.19 Moreover, every state, as well as the
District of Columbia, has established some agency to enforce its Code
or rules, and has authorized a variety of sanctions that may be im-
12. Id.
13. Id. Canon 21.
14. Id.
15. See generally E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1973) (compiling notes and documents underlying the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct).
16. LISA L. MiLORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 7 (1992).
17. See id. at 8 (explaining the 1990 Code Committee's decision to maintain the enforceable
nature of the 1972 Code by keeping the Canons clear and distinct from their corresponding
sections); THODE, supra note 15, at 43 (making special note of the 1972 Code Committee's insis-
tence on including a system of enforceable standards).
18. See SHAMAN ET AL, supra note 2, at 3-4 (stating that this near nationwide adoption of the
Code helps standardize judicial conduct from state-to-state).
19. Id. at 4.
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posed upon judges who violate ethical standards.20 In the federal sys-
tem, judicial councils in each circuit enforce the Code and apply
sanctions for its violation.21
The Code of Judicial Conduct governs off-the-bench as well as on-
the-bench conduct of judges. It places restrictions upon extrajudicial
activities22 in addition to restrictions upon activities that are part of
the official judicial function.2 3 Indeed, the Code expressly states that
"a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of the judge's activities," and "shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. '24
Certainly there are reasons to place some restrictions upon a
judge's extrajudicial activities. Off-the-bench activity may distract a
judge or interfere with the proper performance of the duties of of-
fice. 25 Extrajudicial activity may give rise to bias or a conflict of inter-
est that should be avoided, or it may demean the integrity of the
judiciary.26 And judges should not be able to exploit their judicial
office for private gain.27
But that is not to say that all restrictions upon a judge's off-the-
bench activities are justifiable. As previously noted, judges do live in
the real world, and cannot be secluded from society.28 As individuals,
judges should be allowed outside activity and interaction with other
people. Moreover, judges can benefit society in ways that would not
be possible if their extrajudicial activities are unduly restricted. Per-
20. Id. at 5-7.
21. Id. at 7-8.
22. See MODEL CODE Canon 4 (covering all areas of extrajudicial conduct, including quasiju-
dicial behavior, nonjudicial activities, and financial disclosure).
23. See id. Canon 3 (dividing these official duties into six general categories including duties in
general, adjudicative responsibilities, administrative obligations, disciplinary rules, and disquali-
fication duties).
24. Id. Canon 2 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., SHAMAN ET AL, supra note 2, at 277 (listing potential judicial distractions as
business involvement, investments, and participation or membership in charitable or civic
organizations).
26. See id. at 268-70 (noting that Canon 5 of the Model Code has been interpreted to require
judges to abstain from membership in such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan, as well as from
serving as board members to groups, such as a legal aid society or Mothers Against Drunk
Drivers that are engaged in frequent litigation).
27. See, e.g., In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3 (1985) (disciplining judge for using confidential infor-
mation from a case before him to pressure a litigant in the case to sell him real property at an
extremely favorable price).
28. See McKay, supra note 10 (commenting that judges must be familiar with the world
outside of the courtroom in order to properly settle the disputes over which they preside).
[Vol. 45:605
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haps most important, involvement in the outside world can enrich ju-
dicial sensibility and thereby enhance judicial ability.29
There are those who believe that the Code of Judicial Conduct goes
too far in attempting to disengage judges from the outside world.30
Professor Charles Wolfram, for one, has criticized the Code for tip-
ping the balance too far toward isolating judges from the rest of soci-
ety. 31 The Code, he says, "fall[s] just short of requiring that judges
undertake a kind of monastic withdrawal from the world." 32
The latest version of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the 1990 version,
acknowledges that "[c]omplete separation of a judge from extra-judi-
cial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become
isolated from the community in which the judge lives." 33 Further-
more, Canon 4 of the Code expressly allows judges to engage in cer-
tain extrajudicial activities, including speaking, writing, lecturing, and
teaching, so long as they do not cast doubt on judicial impartiality,
demean the judicial office, or interfere with the proper performance
of judicial duties.34 Commentary to Canon 4 notes that because of
their special learning, judges are in a unique position to contribute to
the improvement of the law and legal system, and the Commentary
therefore actively encourages judges to participate in extrajudicial ac-
tivities concerning the law and legal system.35 In that respect, the
Code of Judicial Conduct is consistent with the principles of the First
Amendment of the Constitution, according to which there is great
value in participating in public discourse. 36 It is by participating in
public discourse, or in the marketplace of ideas, that we improve our
laws, our legal system, our government, our society, our lives. 37
29. See Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1, 25-30 (illustrating the delicate balance between
judicial observation of debates outside the courtroom and the appearance of improper ex parte
communication with a story about Judge Benjamin Cardozo and his attendance, not participa-
tion, at pre-Palsgraf debates).
30. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ET-ics 980 (Practitioner ed. 1986) (referring
to a comment by Jerome Frank that a judge could only achieve this "ideal" disengagement
through death).
31. See id. (criticizing the "idealized model" for forcing judges to discontinue valuable outside
commitments).
32. Id.
33. MODEL CODE Canon 4A cmt.
34. Id. Canon 4A.
35. Id. Canon 4B cmt.
36. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting
that "a fundamental principle" of the American government is freedom of expression and that
"public discussion is a political duty" of its citizens).
37. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade of ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought of get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... ").
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III. THE IDEAL OF THE DISINTERESTED JUDGE
The 1924 Canons envisioned an ideal judge who was neutral, imper-
sonal, and disinterested. 38 That traditional vision of the ideal judge
has persisted in more recent times. As one court put it, "[i]t is axio-
matic that a judge serves as a neutral and detached magistrate. ' 39 Or,
as Justice Frankfurter once noted, a judge "must think dispassionately
and submerge private feelings on every aspect of a case."' 40 This view
of the judicial function stresses disengagement, and calls for judges
who are disinterested, detached, and dispassionate.
Perhaps the most prominent jurist who embodied the ideal of the
disinterested judge was the great Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. G. Edward White, a biographer of Holmes and an
assiduous student of his thought, has described Holmes' approach to
judging, at least on the Supreme Court, as follows:
Detachment seems the most accurate term to characterize
Holmes' stance on the Supreme Court. He was not merely skepti-
cal; his emotions were for the most part not engaged. To put it
more precisely, his emotions were stimulated by the professional
features of his work but not by its substance. Few judges could pack
more emotion into an opinion, but the emotion was not often gener-
ated from compassion for the litigants or concern for the serious-
ness of the issue at stake. It was the emotion of a literary talent, a
person who liked the sound of memorable phrases ....
One can see Holmes' stance of detachment as the culmination of
his intellectual history .... Acquaintances of Holmes had from his
early years noted his apparent indifference to others. His father
thought he "look[ed] at life as at a solemn show where he is only a
spectator."'41
One of the more disquieting aspects of Holmes' detachment was his
indifference to the world around him. He never read a newspaper 42
and professed that facts were a "bore. ' 43 Indeed, he flatly stated, "I
hate facts.""4 On one occasion he bristled with indignation when Jus-
tice Brandeis suggested that he spend a summer improving his mind
38. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETICs Canons 20, 21, 25-33 (1924) (governing neutrality in
decisions, consistency in judgments, and detachment from many community activities).
39. West Va. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n. v. Dostert, 271 S.E.2d 427, 434 (W. Va. 1980) (empha-
sis added).
40. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952).
41. G. EDWARD WHITE, INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT-EssAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY
AND JURISPRUDENCE 88 (1994).
42. Yosal Rogat, The Judge As Spectator, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 213, 244 (1964).
43. II HoLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 14 (Howe ed. 1941).
44. Id. at 13.
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by studying some "domain of fact" and visiting factories to observe
working conditions there.45
Holmes' disinterest is illustrated in an exchange he once had with
another great judge, Learned Hand.46 The two jurists had shared a
ride in an old coupe, with Holmes on his way to a Supreme Court
conference. As they started to walk their separate ways, Hand said,
"Well, sir, good-bye. Do justice. '47 Turning sharply, Holmes called
out to Hand, "Come here. Come here."'48 Then Holmes delivered a
short lecture to Hand. "[Doing justice,]" Holmes said, "is not my job.
My job is to play the game according to the rules."'49 On another oc-
casion Holmes went so far as to say, "I hate justice. '50
A similar antipathy shows up in Holmes' correspondence with the
English political scientist Harold Laski. In one letter to Laski,
Holmes proclaimed that: "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I
will help them.151 That sort of sentiment has prompted one observer
to portray Holmes as "fundamentally antithetical in his detached ac-
ceptance and detached rejection of men as he saw them."52 "To a
remarkable degree, Holmes simply did not care."'53
Holmes' detachment is apparent in his dissenting opinion in Loch-
ner v. New York, 54 an opinion that has garnered more credit than it
may deserve. In Lochner, a case that led to the "New Deal Court
Crisis" and has come to symbolize the excesses of judicial interven-
tion, a slim majority of the Supreme Court ruled that a labor law set-
ting maximum hours for bakers unduly interfered with liberty of
contract and therefore was a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 5 The five-person majority equated due
process of law with an extremely conservative economic policy and in
the bargain bestowed an undeserved constitutional status upon the
concept of liberty of contract. This provided Holmes, who of course
45. Id.
46. LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 302, 306-07 (3d ed.
1960).
47. Id. at 307.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 306.
51. See I HOLMES-LASKI LErTERS 249 (Howe ed. 1953) (explaining to Laski how he (Holmes)
hoped he was not influenced by his personal opinion in the Steel Trust case since he knew the
nation "liked" the law).
52. See Rogat, supra note 42, at 226 (concluding that Holmes accepted the transgressions of
humankind while refusing to be concerned with the destruction between humans).
53. Id. at 255.
54. 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
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had a genius for aphorisms, with the opportunity for one of his better
ripostes. "The 14th [sic] Amendment," he retorted in dissent, "does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."' 56
Another dissenting opinion written by the first Justice Harlan (and
joined by Justices White and Day) was less clever but more careful. 57
Justice Harlan pointed out that liberty of contract was not absolute
and could be limited by state regulations reasonably designed to pro-
tect health. 58 To demonstrate that the law in question was a reason-
able health measure, Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion included a
good deal of empirical evidence describing the health hazards faced
by bakers and showing that in fact their health was substandard.5 9
This, of course, was of no avail to the majority.60 To Justice
Holmes, on the other hand, it was of no interest. 61 His dissenting
opinion in Lochner, which was joined by no other justice, is a typical
example of two aspects of Holmes' detachment.62 First, "boring" facts
about health hazards or working conditions find no place in his opin-
ion. Second, "doing justice" was not his job. As Holmes put it in his
Lochner opinion, his "agreement or disagreement has nothing to do
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law."'63 The
state may regulate life in many ways "as injudicious or if you like as
tyrannical as this .... "64 In other words, if his "fellow citizens want to
go to Hell," Holmes may not offer them affirmative help, but he cer-
tainly was not about to lift even a little finger to stop them.65
It is important to note that in many respects Holmes was a great
philosopher of law. His book, The Common Law-not to mention
other works of his-was truly pathbreaking and led to the founding of
modern jurisprudence. Insofar as his detachment is concerned, how-
56. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 65-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 66-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing numerous authorities which supported state
regulations "designed and calculated to promote the general welfare or to guard the public
health .... ).
59. See id. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Professor Hirt in his treatise.., has said: 'The labor
of the bakers is among the hardest and most laborious imaginable, because it has to be per-
formed under conditions injurious to the health of those engaged in it.' ").
60. See id. at 59 ("We think that there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker ... is not
an unhealthy one .... There must be more than a mere fact of the possible existence of some
small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with liberty.").
61. See id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that he (Holmes) did not find it his duty to
analyze the proposed economic theory or other debated rationales, such as the health hazards of
bakers). In fact, Justice Holmes explicitly declined to address the health rationale at all.
62. Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65. 1 HOLMEs-LASKI LEl-IERS, supra note 51, at 249.
[Vol. 45:605
THE IMPARTIAL JUDGE
ever, Holmes has been subject to a fair amount of condemnation.66
He has been castigated as "a bleak, harsh figure... a tough old party,
quite aware that he was deficient in empathy. '67 He has been called
"savage, harsh, and cruel, a bitter and lifelong pessimist. ' 68 He has
been depicted as "emotionally impoverished ...a man who sup-
pressed his own feelings and isolated himself from most of those
things believed to give life meaning .... 69 To be sure, there are
those who see Holmes' emotional estrangement as a positive source
for his judicial ability. For instance, one commentator maintains that
Holmes was "a profoundly injured spirit, and his greatness as a human
being can be justly viewed only in light of that fact."'70 Most observers
of Holmes, however, see his emotional detachment as a decided detri-
ment to his judicial capacity.71
In all probability, it is Yosal Rogat who strikes the right tone and
poses exactly the right question about Holmes' dispassion when he
says:
It is true that we associate detachment with the judicial function,
and require a minimum of neutrality. But Holmes more strikingly
than any other judge invites a questions that is rarely asked:
Whether a minimum of involvement is not also required. Holmes
was certainly sufficiently detached. Was he, however, sufficiently
engaged? 72
As a judge-indeed, as a human being-Holmes was truly disinter-
ested. He was genuinely disengaged from the mortal problems that
came before him for resolution in case after case. Genuine detach-
ment such as Holmes possessed is a rare quality in judges. Most
judges are more engaged than Holmes was about the issues they face.
They may, however, attempt, either consciously or unconsciously, to
appear detached. They may refrain from expressing their feelings and
beliefs. Whether on the bench or off, they may forgo speaking out
66. Rogat, supra note 42, at 225-26; see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, Encounters with O.W.
Holmes, Jr., in HOLMES AND THE COMMON LAW: A CENTURY LATER (1983); GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); GARY J. AICHELE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.-
SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JUDGE (1989).
67. KAPLAN, supra note 66, at 12-14. After an awakening to Holmes' truer, non-paternalistic,
attributes, Kaplan seeks what he calls a "more balanced appreciation of Holmes." Id. at 15-16.
68. GILMORE, supra note 66, at 48-49. Gilmore exposes Holmes' truer, less commendable,
attributes in contradistinction to his legendary status at the time of World War I. Id.
69. AicHELE, supra note 66, at 164. Aichele concludes that Holmes' deference to the political
majority and "deaf-ear" to the plight of the minority was the most troubling aspect of Holmes'
approach to the law. Id.
70. Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from Within, 18 VAND. L. REV. 437, 470-71 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Rogat, supra note 42, at 243 (highlighting Holmes' detachment from society as
the major limitation to his role in the judiciary).
72. Id.
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about matters in which they believe. They may abstain from making
speeches, writing articles, or engaging in associational activities that
manifest their beliefs and ideas. Or, when they do venture to express
their views, they may do so cautiously, being careful not to go too far,
not to take a position, not to say what they really think.
By curtailing their expression in this way, judges may cultivate an
appearance of neutrality when in fact they are not neutral at all. For
many judges, Holmesian detachment may be a matter of appearance
but not reality. It may be an outward stance that cloaks a judge's
inner feelings and beliefs.
So, there are two questions that need to be asked about the ideal of
the disinterested judge. First, is it desirable? And second, is it
possible?
The ideal of the disinterested judge is tied to the nineteenth century
view that law is a science that can be mechanically applied by judges.73
According to this view, law and the judicial function were thought to
be essentially nonideological. 74 Law was seen as neutral, objective,
and devoid of values. 75 Hence, it was for the legislative and executive
branches of our government, but not the judiciary, to make value
judgements or policy choices.76 Judicial decisions, then, did not re-
quire the exercise of will or discretion, 77 and certainly had nothing to
do with making values choices. Judges were expected to be uncon-
cerned about policy, or detached from it; it simply was none of their
business.
This view of the judicial function persevered through the beginning
of the twentieth century. So, for example, in 1905, while striking
down a maximum hours law in Lochner v. New York on the ground
that the law unduly interfered with liberty of contract and was not a
valid health measure, the Supreme Court had either the myopia or the
temerity to claim that it "was not substituting the judgment of the
court for that of the legislature. ' 78 As late as 1936, Supreme Court
Justice Owen Roberts declared that when an act of Congress is chal-
73. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 605-11 (1908) ("Law
is scientific in order to eliminate so far as may be the personal equation in judicial administra-
tion, to preclude corruption and to limit the dangerous possibilities of magisterial ignorance.").
74. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY ch. 1 (1992) (stating that although the judicial function was to remain
neutral, the judiciary was challenged at times with legal issues that fell outside "core" areas of
the law and were, thus, unequipped to analyze those issues).
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 18.
77. Id.
78. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905).
[Vol. 45:605
THE IMPARTIAL JUDGE
lenged as unconstitutional, "the judicial branch of the Government
has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is in-
voked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former .... This court neither approves
nor condemns any legislative policy. '79
By the time Justice Roberts uttered those infamous words, however,
serious doubt about the traditional view of the judicial function was
well under way.80 Indeed, the doubt began in 1881, when Holmes, "a
generation ahead of his time"8' and two decades before his appoint-
ment to the high Court, published his groundbreaking opus, The Com-
mon Law. In chapter one, Holmes proclaimed:
[T]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed ....
[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative .... It is legisla-
tive in its grounds .... Every important principle which is devel-
oped by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy .... 82
After Holmes' book, the traditional view of law came under in-
creasing criticism. In 1908 Roscoe Pound published his seminal arti-
cle, Mechanical Jurisprudence,83 paving the way for a new school of
thought, "Legal Realism," that was devoted to exploding the tradi-
tional myth that law was separate from policy and values. 84 By today,
the traditional view of mechanical jurisprudence has been thoroughly
discredited as a myth that bears little relationship to the reality of the
judicial function.8 5 Nonetheless, the traditional view has never been
entirely abandoned, and it still prevails in some corners more than
others. Indeed, there seems to be a never-ending quest to make the
law objective and devoid of human value judgments. For example, in
the realm of constitutional law, which by character is one of the most
political areas of the law, the Supreme Court and some constitutional
scholars seem bent upon constructing a network of abstract rules that
79. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).
80. See generally HoRwrrz, supra note 74.
81. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 376 (1950).
82. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1, 35 (1881).
83. See Pound, supra note 73.
84. See WrmE, supra note 41, at 166 (describing Legal Realism as a late 1920s and 1930s
jurisprudential movement driven by the principle that "individuals 'made a difference' in politics
and government").
85. Id. at 289.
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give the appearance of objectivity and neutrality while masking the
human value choices that the Court makes.86
Four decades after Holmes' book lifted the veil from the judicial
function, another important book about the judicial process was writ-
ten by another jurist destined to become a Supreme Court Justice.
Like Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo was well aware that judging neces-
sarily entailed choosing among values. In The Nature Of The Judicial
Process, Cardozo wrote:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little
more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted
standard of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combina-
tion shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces shall dom-
inate in any case must depend largely upon the comparative
importance or value of the social interest that will be thereby pro-
moted or impaired .... I think that the judges themselves have
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations
of social advantage. The duty is inevitable ... 87
Cardozo understood that in an important sense the judicial function
was much like the legislative function. 88 He explained:
If you ask how [a judge] is to know when one interest outweighs
another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as
the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in
brief, from life itself. Here, indeed, is the point of contact between
the legislator's work and [the judge's]. The choice of methods, the
appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by like consider-
ations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within
the limits of his competence. 89
86. See Morton Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Funda-
mentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30 (1993) (tracing the 1992 Supreme Court Term's decisions, and
some Justices' apparent reliance on "mechanical jurisprudence" to employ a technical equation
that ultimately eliminates their personal values); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The
Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 236, 252-53 (1983) (stating that
"through the manipulation of constitutional fact, the Supreme Court obscures its own creative
function in interpreting the Constitution"); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The
Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OmUo ST. L.J. 161, 174 (1984) (finding that a
major problem of the Supreme Court's multi-tier review is its focus on abstractions in which the
Justices become "primarily concerned with the problem of judicial review, to the exclusion of the
specific disputes that gave rise to them").
87. CARDozo, supra note 1, at 112, 118-19.
88. Id. at 119.
89. Id. at 113. It is correct that immediately after the quoted passage, Cardozo went on to say:
"No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the
open spaces in the law." Id.
However, shortly after that passage, Cardozo continued to say: "None the less [sic], within the
confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom
which stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but
made. The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom." Id. at 115.
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Unlike Holmes, however, Cardozo did not shrink from the conse-
quences of the nature of the judicial process. Here is Cardozo as seen
through the eyes of yet another Supreme Court Justice, William Bren-
nan, whose comments may be as much about himself as about
Cardozo:
Having admitted and demonstrated that judges inevitably confront
value choices, Cardozo did not shrink from the implications of that
admission. He rejected the prevailing myth that a judge's personal
values were irrelevant to the decision process, because a judge's role
was ... governed by external, objective norms. Cardozo acknowl-
edged that judges, like common mortals, cannot divorce themselves
completely from their personal, subjective vision .... He attacked
the myth that judges were oracles of pure reason, and insisted that
we consider the role that human experience, emotion, and passion
play in the judicial process.90
Thus, if Holmes represents the ideal of judicial detachment, Car-
dozo represents the ideal of judicial passion. To be sure, it is a very
careful passion. Cardozo was chary about his passion, but unlike
Holmes, he embraced it. Whereas Holmes thought that doing justice
was not his job and if his fellow citizens wanted to go to Hell he would
help them, Cardozo believed that the function of judges was to en-
hance the well-being of their fellow humans.91 "The final cause of the
law," he stated, "is the welfare of society," 92 and the business of
judges is to promote social welfare. 93
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE LAW
Justice Cardozo's exemplary career illustrates that detachment is
not a necessary element of judicial impartiality and that passion is not
incompatible with the judicial function. To be sure, there are limits to
how far a judge should allow his or her passion to go. Judges are, after
all, obligated to follow the law. While judges often have a good deal
of discretion in interpreting and applying the law, that discretion is not
boundless. Judicial discretion is abused when a judge does not com-
port with the dictate of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
90. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and The Progress of the Law: The Forty-Second
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, 10 CARnOzo L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1988); see generally Hon.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965 (1993) (ac-
knowledging that the judiciary is vulnerable to personal judgments, predilections and exper-
iences even though numerous constraints exist to limit such subjective influences).
91. See CARDozo, supra note 87, at 66-67 (noting that the extent a judge's duty is to extend or
restrict existing rules as society deems appropriate rather than to fabricate rules on a whim).
92. Id. at 66.
93. See id. at 67 (arguing that judges should allow the welfare of society to dictate the direc-
tion and scope of existing rules).
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which states that "[a] judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it.''94 Ordinarily, when a judge exercises
his or her discretion incorrectly-that is, makes a legally incorrect rul-
ing-it is a matter for appeal and does not raise a question of unethi-
cal behavior under the Code of Judicial Conduct.95 However, some
courts have ruled that under certain circumstances legal error-an in-
correct exercise of judicial discretion-may be a violation of the man-
date of Canon 3 that a judge shall be faithful to the law.96
This is an extremely sensitive issue, because to find that the Code of
Judicial Conduct may be violated by an incorrect judicial ruling seems
to threaten judicial independence. In this nation, there has been a
long-standing belief in judicial independence so that judges can be
free to make decisions according to their consciences without undue
pressure or influence. Judicial independence is a cornerstone of our
legal system recognized in the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 of
which expressly states that the independence of the judiciary should
be preserved and that the provisions of the Code should be construed
and applied to further that objective. 97
Accordingly, it is only under limited circumstances that an incorrect
legal ruling will be considered to violate the requirement of Canon 3
that a judge be faithful to the law. An incorrect legal ruling is an
abuse of discretion in violation of Canon 3 if it is motivated by bad
faith. For instance, unbelievable as it may seem, there are a number
of cases that might be called "coin-flip cases,"-that is, instances when
judges make a decision by flipping a coin in open court, or by throw-
ing a dart at a dart board, or by taking a vote of the spectators in the
courtroom. 98 That sort of behavior goes distinctly beyond the bounds
of judicial independence because it constitutes a complete abdication
94. MODEL CODE Canon 3B(2).
95. See In re Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158 (Me. 1985) (acknowledging that judges occasionally will
commit legal errors, and judicial discipline is inappropriate in those cases where something more
than mere legal error is absent); In re Thomson, 494 A.2d 1022 (N.J. 1985) (holding that if a
judge's ruling regarding a defendant's constitutional rights is incorrect, it may be reversed on
appeal and does not automatically constitute judicial misconduct).
96. See In re Scott, 386 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 1979) (acknowledging that a pattern of disregard or
indifference to fact or law, especially in juvenile and criminal cases, has led to discipline under
the Code of Judicial Conduct); In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973) (holding that a judge's
misapplication of bail statutes was a gross abuse of discretion and warranted sanctions).
97. MODEL CODE Canon 1 cmt.
98. See In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301 (La. 1976) (holding that coin-flipping or holding a specta-
tor ballot prior to a judge's ruling on a defendant's guilt or innocence gives the public the im-
proper impression that the outcome of cases is arbitrary and injures the public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary); Currin v. Commission on Judicial Fitness & Disabil-
ity, 815 P.2d 212 (Or. 1991) (holding that plaintiff is entitled to examine complaints and depose
complainants regarding a judge's practice of coin-flipping in traffic infraction cases); see also In
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of the duty to exercise judgment. The essence of the judicial function
is to make judgments, in other words, to make reasoned decisions ac-
cording to the law. Deciding a case by the flip of a coin is decision-
making completely without reason and that ignores the law. In fact, it
violates Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires
judges to uphold the integrity of the law;99 it violates Canon 2, which
requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety;' 00 and it violates Canon 3, which requires judges to decide cases
impartially and diligently, as well as to be faithful to the law and main-
tain professional competence in it.1o'
Another instance of ignoring the law occurred in a 1991 case from
Massachusetts, In re King,02 which involved a judge who set unusu-
ally high bail for four African-American defendants in retaliation for
the overwhelming rejection of his brother by African-American voters
in a gubernatorial primary election. After imposing the bail, the judge
said to a court clerk, "[tihat's what blacks get for voting against my
brother."'103 Unlike the coin-flip cases, here the judge had a reason
for the decision he made, but it was a reason completely at odds with
the law. Obviously, that the African-American community voted
against the judge's brother has nothing to do with the legally appropri-
ate amount of bail. To impose high bail for that reason is a gross
abuse of judicial discretion that is unfaithful to the law and abdicates
the judicial duty to exercise judgment according to the law. 0 4
V. OPENMINDEDNESS
These cases remind us that judges are not autocrats. 0 5 They are
obligated to be faithful to the law and to apply it impartially. More-
over, judges are expected to be openminded in regard to the cases
re Rose, unreported determination (N.Y. 1979) (telling defendant in open court that the judge
was dismissing defendant's criminal charges because it was the judge's first case).
99. MODEL CODE Canon 1.
100. Id. Canon 2.
101. Id. Canon 3.
102. 568 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. 1991).
103. Id. at 594.
104. Id. at 599. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the judge in this case
had committed a number of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and therefore censured
him and permanently enjoined him from sitting in his court. Id.
105. See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 373 (Pa. 1987):
Judges are not autocrats; they are not police forces; they are not religious advisors; and
they do not legislate their own rules and statutes. Rather, they are impartial arbiters
under the precedents, rules of court and statutes of this Commonwealth to insure that
those who appear before them receive justice. The power of a judge is enormous, and
concomitantly, no position in our society demands higher standards.
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over which they preside. It is often said that to maintain the requisite
degree of impartiality, judges should not predetermine their decisions.
In other words, they should keep an open mind about the outcome of
a case until all of the evidence and arguments have been presented.
Still, as a case proceeds, it is only natural for a judge to form various
opinions about it. As one court explained, any evidence heard by a
judge is bound to engender a certain reaction or attitude regarding
how the case may be decided, but so long as the judge is not influ-
enced by extraneous factors and so long as the judge keeps an open
mind about the final outcome of the case, the judge will be considered
sufficiently impartial.106
If made before a jury, a judge's comments on the evidence as a case
proceeds may be improper because they unduly influence the jurors,
but such comments do not necessarily indicate bias on the part of the
judge and are not improper where no jury is present. 107 Comments or
remarks made in court that are indicative of a judge's reaction to evi-
dence are not disqualifying so long as the judge has not made a final
decision in the case.
On occasion, judges voluntarily disqualify themselves if they feel
they cannot be openminded in a case. For example, some years ago
Justice Frankfurter voluntarily recused himself from a case in which
two bus passengers claimed that their right of privacy was violated
when a public utility commission gave its approval to a bus company
to pipe music and other radio programs into its buses. 10 8 In stepping
aside from the case, Justice Frankfurter explained: "My feelings are
so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I
had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it."109 It is inter-
esting that Frankfurter felt compelled to disqualify himself, but could
not resist the temptation to remark in the official Supreme Court re-
ports, no less, that he was a "victim" of the practice in controversy. 110
Still, Frankfurter deserves credit for being able to admit of his own
volition that he could not be openminded about the case.
106. Banks v. Department of Human Resources, 233 S.E.2d 449, 450 (Ga. 1977); see also In re
J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1943):
The court room is a place of surging emotions .... [T]he parties are keyed up to the
contest, often in open defiance; and the topics at issue are often calculated to stir up the
sympathy, prejudice, or ridicule of the tribunal .... If the judge did not form judg-
ments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render
decisions.
Id.
107. Banks, 233 S.E.2d at 450.
108. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
109. Id. at 467 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
110. Id.
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Often it is extremely difficult to determine exactly when a judge has
crossed the line and lost the requisite degree of openmindedness.
Consider, for example, Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,"' a 1992 deci-
sion that concerned a tort action claiming that the decedent's death
had been caused by smoking cigarettes produced by the defendant
company. The case had been in litigation for over four years when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit removed the
trial judge, Judge Sarokin, from further presiding over the case, be-
cause he made the following statement in an interim opinion:
In the light of the current controversy surrounding breast implants,
one wonders when all industries will recognize their obligation to
voluntarily disclose risks from the use of their products. All too
often in the choice between the physical health of consumers and
the financial well-being of business, concealment is chosen over dis-
closure, sales over safety, and money over morality. Who are these
persons who knowingly and secretly decide to put the buying public
at risk solely for the purpose of making profits and who believe that
illness and death of consumers is an appropriate cost of their own
prosperity! As the following facts disclose, despite some rising
pretenders, the tobacco industry may be the king of concealment
and disinformation. 112
Although professing that its decision was "most agonizing," the
Court of Appeals nonetheless ordered that Judge Sarokin be removed
from the case.113 In the view of the appellate court, Judge Sarokin
was disqualified because the statement he made concerned one of the
"ultimate issues to be determined by a jury" in the case-whether the
defendants had concealed information about the risks of smoking."
4
Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge could
no longer maintain the appearance of impartiality that is required by
due process of law." 5
The Court of Appeals certainly was correct that Judge Sarokin's
statement concerned an ultimate issue in the case, namely, whether
111. 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
112. Id.
113. The Court of Appeals also noted that Judge Sarokin was "a distinguished member of the
federal judiciary for almost 15 years and ... is well known and respected for magnificent abilities
and outstanding jurisprudential and judicial temperament." Id. at 98. In disqualification cases,
this sort of praise coming from an appellate court often is the kiss of death for trial judges. In
another case, for example, an appellate court began its opinion by describing the trial judge as
"one of the ablest and most experienced judges of [a] distinguished trial bench," before quickly
moving on to order his disqualification from the case. In re International Bus. Machines Corp.,
45 F.3d 641, 642 (1995). In the case of Judge Sarokin, however, sometime after Haines he was
promoted to the Court of Appeals in an apparent confirmation of his ability as a judge. STE-
PHFN GILLERS, REOULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAw AND ETIcs 591 (4th ed. 1995).
114. Haines, 975 F.2d at 98.
115. Id.
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the defendants had fraudulently concealed information about the dan-
gers of smoking. But, in addition to being an ultimate issue for the
jury to decide, it also was an interim issue raised through a discovery
motion that Judge Sarokin was required to rule upon at that point in
the litigation. 116 The plaintiff in the case had asked the judge to order
the defendant to produce certain documents that the plaintiff believed
showed that the tobacco industry had intentionally concealed infor-
mation about the dangers of smoking.117 The defendants claimed the
documents were exempt from discovery under either the attorney-cli-
ent or work-product privilege, while the plaintiffs countered that those
privileges were nullified by the crime-fraud exception. 118 Thus, in rul-
ing on the discovery motion, it was necessary for Judge Sarokin to
decide the question of fraudulent concealment.
One commentator has argued that Judge Sarokin's statement went
too far because, in ruling on the discovery motion, all that was neces-
sary to decide was whether there was prima facie evidence of fraudu-
lent conduct. 119 But if the evidence clearly established more than a
prima facie case of fraudulent conduct, what could be wrong about
saying so?
Apparently, the judge's sin was not that he commented on an issue
of ultimate fact, but rather that his comment was perceived as an over-
statement. But what if his comment was supported by the evidence
and was factually accurate? If so, is it fair to characterize it as "over-
statement?" Moreover, it rarely is considered disqualifying when
judges make extreme statements in the course of their work, even
when they comment on ultimate issues of fact. So long as a judge
remains openminded about the final outcome of a case, statements
made by the judge in response to evidence presented in the case do
not amount to disqualifying bias. Ordinarily, to be disqualifying, judi-
cial remarks must derive from an extrajudicial source. Comments
made by a judge in the context of litigation are considered a normal
aspect of adjudication and are not disqualifying unless they are so
egregious as to destroy all semblance of openmindedness.
The Supreme Court has said that "U]udicial rulings alone almost
never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality motion ... and can
only in the rarest of circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism
116. Id. at 85.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 85-86.
119. Panel Discussion-Disqualification of Judges (The Sarokin Matter): Is It A Threat To
Judicial Independence?, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1063, 1081 (1993) (noting that Judge Sarokin's com-
ments lashing out at the tobacco industry and displaying his outrage were inappropriate at the
beginning of a trial where the jury had not yet been selected).
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or antagonism required [for disqualification]."' 120 In fact, there are a
number of cases in which it has been held not to be improper bias for
a judge to express extreme disapproval of a defendant's behavior. In
one case, it was found not to be disqualifying for a judge to describe
the defendants as part of "a large scale conspiracy composed of the
most vicious individuals that this court has ever seen."'121 In another
case, it was ruled not to be disqualifying for the judge to describe the
defendant as "[t]he most viciously antisocial person who has ever
come before me.' 22 There are even several cases that go so far as to
hold that it is not disqualifying for a judge to announce before all the
evidence has been presented in a case that he or she believes the de-
fendant to be guilty as charged. 123 Compared to those comments,
Judge Sarokin's statement in Haines hardly seems to be so extreme
that he should be disqualified from presiding over the case.
It is instructive to compare the Haines case to another federal case,
United States v. Barry, 24 that was decided the same year, but in a
different federal circuit. In Barry, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia found that a trial judge who states his or
her views about the merits of a pending proceeding does not necessar-
ily create an appearance of partiality that requires recusal.125 In this
case, the trial judge, Judge Jackson, was presiding over the criminal
prosecution of former Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, who
was convicted of one misdemeanor count for possession of cocaine
and acquitted of another possession charge, while the jury could not
reach a verdict on twelve other counts. 126 While an appeal was pend-
ing which would eventually see the case remanded to Judge Jackson
for resentencing, Judge Jackson made some public comments about
the case in a speech at Harvard Law School. In the speech, the judge
120. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994).
121. United States v. Archbold Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 681 (5th Cir. 1977).
122. United States v. Antonelli, 582 F. Supp. 880, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
123. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1976) (holding that the trial judge did
abuse his discretion in sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment even though he told de-
fense counsel that the defendant may stand a better chance with a jury); Commonwealth v.
Leventhal, 307 N.E.2d 839 (Mass. 1974) (holding that a judge's prejudicial remarks during trial
displaying to the jury his belief in the defendant's guilt did not affect the disposition of the case);
United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1972) (acknowledging that a judge does reach
some conclusions as to guilt before the close of the trial, and thus, a judge's statement that a
defendant is guilty during pre-trial hearings does not deprive the defendant of a fair and impar-
tial trail); People v. Diaz, 427 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1967) (holding that a judge's comment while in his
chambers that everyone is convinced of the defendant's guilt before the trial ended did not show
that the judge was prejudiced in denying defendant's motion for a new trial).
124. 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 263.
126. Id. at 261.
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said that he was convinced that Barry was guilty of perjury and other
crimes. 127 Judge Jackson further remarked that he had never seen a
stronger government case, that some jurors had their own agendas
and would not convict under any circumstances, and that some jurors
were determined to acquit the petitioner regardless of the facts.128
Mayor Barry argued that these comments created an appearance of
partiality that required disqualification of the judge. 129 The Court of
Appeals, however, while noting that a judge should abstain from out-
of-court public comment about a pending proceeding, concluded that
the judge's remarks did not require his disqualification.130 The appel-
late court pointed out that the long-standing rule is that to be disquali-
fying, the appearance of bias or prejudice must stem from an
extrajudicial source.' 3' In this case, virtually all of the judge's extraju-
dicial remarks were based on previous comments that he had made at
the sentencing of the defendant. 32 The Court of Appeals also noted
that a judge's remarks that reflect strong views about a defendant do
not call for recusal if the remarks are based on the judge's own obser-
vations during the performance of his judicial duties. 133 Recusal is not
required unless the remarks give rise to a reasonable appearance that
the judge cannot be impartial. 34 In this instance, the court concluded
that such an appearance had not been established, and that recusal
was not necessary.135
If recusal was not necessary in the Barry case, it is difficult to see
why it was in Haines. Judge Sarokin's remarks seem to be no more
closeminded or biased than Judge Jackson's, yet the former was re-
moved from a case while the latter was not. Such are the vagaries of a
standard that is inherently subjective and is a matter of degree that
cannot be determined by bright lines.
VI. PERSONAL BIAS OR PREJUDICE
It is possible, however, to be more definitive regarding another
facet of impartiality which concerns bias or prejudice. Although jus-
tice need not be devoid of passion, it should be applied without per-
sonal bias or prejudice toward individuals. Judges should apply the
127. Id. at 264.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 262.
130. Id. at 265.
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id. at 264.
133. Id. at 263.
134. ld.
135. Id. at 265.
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law uniformly and consistently to all persons. In other words, judicial
impartiality should be akin to equal protection of the law. Judges
should apply the law equally or impartially to all persons. 136
This principle is violated when a judge has a personal bias or preju-
dice concerning one of the parties to a controversy. A feeling of ill
will or, conversely, favoritism toward one of the parties is improper,
and indicates that a judge does not possess the requisite degree of
impartiality to decide a case fairly.
A clear example of improper personal bias can be seen in a 1987
Pennsylvania case involving a judge who was presiding over litigation
involving the National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation. 137 During the
course of the litigation, the judge said: "I hate the damn gas company
and if I could find a way to rule against them I would. ' 138 A state-
ment such as this one manifests improper personal bias because it
shows that the judge who made the statement is predisposed against
one of the parties on the basis of personal animosity. Instead of lis-
tening to the evidence and making a ruling on the basis of law, the
judge is looking for a way to rule against the gas company because he
detests it. He has gone into the case with his mind set against the gas
company because he hates it.139
Improper personal bias has been found in several cases where
judges are prejudiced against certain classes of criminal defendants.
In one case, a judge announced that he would follow a policy of sen-
tencing all violators of the Selective Service Act to at least thirty
months in jail, despite any extenuating circumstances. 140 A reviewing
court ruled that the judge's policy amounted to personal bias against a
class of defendants that resulted in abuse of the judge's responsibility
to tailor sentences to the individual defendant.' 41 In another case, a
judge was found to be prejudiced against a class of litigants when he
expressed his disagreement with sentencing guidelines and said that
136. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (providing that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
137. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358 (Pa. 1987).
138. Id. at 366.
139. The judge later asserted that his remark about the gas company was inconsequential and
was being blown out of proportion. He claimed that he made the remark "with tongue in
cheek," and that eventually he ruled in favor of the gas company. Id. at 367. Nonetheless, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that "tongue-in-cheek remarks which announce that the
judge will favor one party over another are grossly improper, and if such remarks are made, the
judge who makes them must stand down from any controversy in which he has indicated a bias."
Id.
140. United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973).
141. Id. at 529.
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the maximum penalty should be imposed in all drug cases. 142 The re-
viewing court found that the judge's statements indicated a predeter-
mined policy in regard to sentencing drug offenders and a personal
bias against a particular class of litigants, which required recusal from
the drug case over which he was presiding. 143
Some of the cases involve judges who are candid enough or disin-
genuous enough to make extremely biased remarks in the presence of
others. In reviewing reported cases, it is disconcerting to see how fre-
quently judges make biased remarks in court or elsewhere in public.
Judges often express personal animosity toward attorneys,144 or,
although less frequently, toward litigants.145 The case law is also re-
plete with instances where judges have expressed racial, ethnic, or
gender bias.146 Perhaps this is not surprising. Judges, after all, are
human beings, and, although we might hope for more from judges, it
must be admitted that they are not immune to the baser motivations
of human behavior. Still, judicial comments that manifest this sort of
extreme and improper bias should be the basis for disqualification of a
judge, not to mention further action against him or her.
Unfortunately, there are severe limitations in attempting to deal
with bias and prejudice by focusing upon remarks or comments that
judges make. While improper remarks or comments of judges should
not be tolerated, the greater danger is the state of mind where bias
and prejudice reside. These evils may be present there and may affect
a judge's rulings, even though the judge makes no remark or comment
to reveal them. One can get the impression from reading the case law
that even though a judge has a biased state of mind, he or she can
conceal it by saying as little as possible. In fact, one reviewing court
has been quite forthright in stating that "in terms of [a judge's] useful-
ness in later cases, it would have been better had he not given voice to
142. Pennsylvania v. Lemanski, 529 A.2d 1085, 1088 (Pa. 1987).
143. Id. at 1089.
144. See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 362-66 (Pa. 1987) (finding
that judge's personal dislike for attorney contributed to the judge's abuse of the criminal con-
tempt powers).
145. See, e.g., In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030 (overturning trial judge's assessment of $1,500
against appellant for three-day delay in trial because the fine seemed colored by personal ani-
mosity on the part of the judge).
146. See, e.g., Catchpole v. Brannon, 36 Cal. App. 4th 237 (1995) (holding that judicial state-
ments suggesting gender bias warranted reversal of court's ruling because the average person
might have justifiably doubted whether trial was impartial); Iverson v. Iverson, 11 Cal. App. 4th
1495 (1992) (holding that language used by trial judge indicated gender bias affecting resolution
of credibility issues thus requiring reversal of court's ruling); In re Stevens, 31 Cal. 3d 403 (1982)
(holding that repeated use by judge of racial and ethnic epithets to counsel and court personnel
in in-chambers conferences, although performing judicial duties fairly and equitably and free
from actual bias, warrants public censure).
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his sentiments."'147 Unfortunately, however, that would do nothing to
alleviate the judge's state of mind. Indeed, if a judge is prejudiced, his
or her silence masks a situation that calls for a strong remedy. The
goal should not be to prevent or punish remarks and comments, but
rather to eliminate bias and prejudice, which are the real root of the
danger.
Certain kinds of bias are incompatible with the judicial function and
are unacceptable in judges. Clearly, racial bias should play no part in
the judicial temperament. In the vast majority of situations that come
before judges, race is an irrelevant consideration that has nothing to
do with the matter at hand since racial bias often is based upon mis-
guided stereotypical thinking about groups of people. Racial bias is
demeaning and offensive to the individuals to whom it is directed. It
denies equal protection of the law, and simply has no place in the
judicial process.
Similarly, gender bias and bias based on ethnic or religious back-
ground is inappropriate for a judge and should be excluded from the
judicial process.148 In fact, bias against any class of persons may be
incompatible with the judicial function, because class bias incorrectly
ascribes the attributes of a group of persons to individual members of
the group. Where a judge has a predilection against a class of persons,
it may operate to improperly predetermine the facts of individual
cases and deny a litigant the right to have his or her case decided on
the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the 1990 Code of Judicial Con-
duct expressly prohibits judges in the performance of their duties from
manifesting bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national ori-
gin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.149
Further, in regard to off-the-bench activities, the 1990 Code prohib-
its judges from belonging to organizations that practice invidious dis-
147. Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., Inc. 467 N.E.2d 222, 225 (Mass. 1984).
The court stated that the judge's expression of sentiments about defendant's films was not advis-
able but this alone did not disqualify the judge. Id.
148. See Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward A Courtroom of One's Own: An Appellate
Court Judge Looks At Gender Bias, 61 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 1209 (1993) (demonstrating how
women face condescension, indifference and hostility in all judicial system roles-from attorneys
and judges to jurors and litigants).
149. MODEL CODE Canon 3B(5) states that
[a] judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in
the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, education, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit
staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's discretion and control to do so.
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crimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin,150
because membership in such organizations gives rise to the appear-
ance of bias or prejudice. 151 Commentary to the Code explains that
whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is often a
complex question which cannot be resolved from a mere examination
of the organization's membership rolls.152 Rather, it may depend on
how the organization selects its members, as well as other factors, such
as that the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious,
ethnic or cultural values of legitimate concern to its members, or that
it is a purely private organization whose membership is within the
constitutional right of privacy. 53 In the absence of these factors, in-
vidious discrimination will be found to exist if an organization ex-
cludes persons from membership for no other reason than their race,
religion, sex, or national origin. 154
In addition to prohibiting a judge from belonging to an organization
that practices invidious discrimination, the 1990 Code also prohibits a
judge to regularly use or to arrange a meeting at a club that the judge
knows practices invidious discrimination. 55 This prohibition recog-
nizes that any public approval by a judge of invidious discrimination
diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.156
VII. AVOWALS OF IMPARTIALITY
When motions are made to judges to disqualify themselves on the
ground of bias or prejudice, they often respond by denying the motion
coupled with an avowal of openmindedness. "I have determined in
my own mind" a judge might proclaim, "that I am openminded and
impartial about this case, and free from bias or prejudice." One some-
times wonders if judges truly believe these statements. Given the
human tendency not to admit one's own shortcomings, I suspect that
most judges do believe these statements, although doubt may lurk
somewhere in their heart of hearts. Moreover, even if a judge does
remain openminded despite indications to the contrary, there is still
an appearance of partiality, which is problematic. I wonder how many
150. MODEL CODE Canon 2C provides: "[a] judge shall not hold membership in any organi-
zation that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national ori-
gin." Id.
151. MODEL CODE Canon 2C cmt.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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judges have considered that their avowals of openmindedness may
have a very hollow ring in the public ear. And after all, the Code of
Judicial Conduct does state that a judge shall disqualify himself or her-
self if the judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." 15 7
Supposedly, the standard that governs the appearance of impartiality
is an objective one: whether an objective observer fully informed of
the relevant facts would reasonably doubt a judge's impartiality. 158
Nonetheless, even some reviewing courts have been excessively re-
ceptive to accepting declarations of apologetic openmindedness after
judges have been challenged for bias or prejudice. 59 In fact, the case
law suggests that a judge can successfully fend off a charge of im-
proper bias or prejudice merely by stating on the record that his or her
mind is still open and that a final decision on the matter will not be
made until the close of all the evidence. All too often, bias or preju-
dice can be cleansed, so to speak, merely by professing a pure heart
and an open mind. While in reality these sorts of avowals of imparti-
ality may be dubious, some reviewing courts have tended to accept
them with an uncritical eye. Perhaps this leniency is rooted in the
exigency of avoiding numerous recusals of judges; but whatever the
reason, the fact remains that a mere recitation by a judge that he or
she remains openminded despite signs suggesting otherwise may be
too readily accepted by the reviewing courts.
For example, in People v. Hall, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled
that recusal of a trial judge was not required where the defendant in a
criminal case had physically assaulted the judge (as well as the public
defender). 160 In refusing to disqualify the judge, the state supreme
157. Id. Canon 3E.
158. See Pepsico, Inc. v McMillan, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a judge's
allowance of an inquiry by a third party for possible future employment with a law firm involved
in the proceeding before him created an appearance of impartiality and warranted the judge's
recusal).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1482 (6th Cir. 1991) (accepting judge's
statement that he set aside his feelings toward defendant as factor supporting finding that judge
was impartial); People v. Hall, 499 N.E.2d 1335, 1347 (I11. 1986) (accepting trial judge's statement
that he would not allow himself to be prejudiced by defendant physically assaulting him); Banks
v. Department of Human Resources, 233 S.E.2d 449, 450 (Ga. 1977) (accepting trial judge's
statement that despite strong remarks disapproving of defendant's behavior, "his mind was not
closed on the subject..."); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Iowa 1976) (accepting trial
judge's explanation for his statement that "the defendant may stand a better chance with a jury
than with me"); Commonwealth v. Leventhal, 307 N.E.2d 839, 842-43 (Mass. 1974) (accepting
trial judge's explanation for his statement "that doesn't give a person a license to steal"); see also
In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 955 (Fla. 1982) (finding that trial judge's strenuous public criticism
of death penalty did not interfere with the performance of judicial duties or decrease public
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary where judge included statement that he would do
his duty as a judge to follow the law as written).
160. 499 N.E.2d at 1335, 1347.
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court noted that the record failed to show any unfairness to the de-
fendant and pointed to the judge's declaration that "I have deter-
mined in my own mind that I shall not allow [the defendant's
behavior] to prejudice me in any way and that I will be completely fair
and impartial in this case .... "161 Readily accepting the judge's
avowal of impartiality, the reviewing court asserted that "The trial
court is in the best position to determine whether it has become
prejudiced against the defendant.' 162 This, of course, assumes that
trial judges can look into themselves and admit their own biases and
prejudices, a practice at which human beings are not always proficient.
It also ignores that trial judges may be in the worst position to deter-
mine whether they appear to be biased or prejudiced and should be
disqualified on that basis.
A hypothetical situation similar to the one in Hall was presented to
judges in a recent survey concerning disqualification. 163 Their re-
sponses to the hypothetical strongly favored disqualification. 164 This
suggests that the respondents either doubted that a judge could in fact
remain impartial after being assaulted by a defendant or that if actual
prejudice did not occur, the appearance of it certainly did.
Still, many appellate courts unquestioningly accept avowals of
openmindedness from trial judges. One notable and recent exception
is In re Schenck,165 a 1994 Oregon decision. This case concerned a
number of incidents with escalating ramifications between a judge and
an attorney. After several of the incidents had occurred, the attorney
filed a complaint with the Oregon judicial commission, asserting that
the judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by incorrectly
refusing to recuse himself in a case. The next day, the judge and attor-
ney had a telephone conversation, during which the judge said, "Who
in the hell made you God's gift to the legal profession?' 1 66 And about
a week later, the judge sent a letter to the local bar association with a
copy of the attorney's complaint, which the judge described as "pa-
thetic" and "petulant."'1 67
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRI-
CAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATrITUDES 33 (1995).
164. See id. (reporting that judge-respondents expressed a strong disposition to disqualify
themselves from a case when the criminal defendant had previously physically assaulted the
judge).
165. 870 P.2d 185 (Or. 1994).
166. Id. at 192.
167. Id.
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When the attorney subsequently had another case assigned to the
same judge, he made a motion to disqualify the judge on the ground
that the judge was biased against him by virtue of their previous con-
frontations. 168 The judge denied this motion, and in a relatively
lengthy statement, explained that whatever may have transpired be-
tween him and the lawyer, the judge believed that he could be fair and
impartial in presiding over the case at bar.' 69
The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, disagreed, and found that
the judge's refusal to recuse himself was a violation of Canon 3C of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.170 The court noted that a judge is not
ordinarily disqualified from presiding over a case where one of the
attorneys has filed a disciplinary complaint against the judge, because
to do so would allow attorneys to "judge shop" by creating disqualify-
ing bias. 17' The court also noted that harsh words between a judge
and lawyer do not usually call for recusal.172 However, if a judge re-
sponds to a complaint filed by an attorney against the judge by affirm-
atively publicizing it and by angrily rebuking the attorney who filed it,
the cumulative effect may be enough to establish disqualifying bias on
the part of the judge.' 73 Thus, in the aggregate the judge's actions
created an appearance of bias, if not actual bias, that required his
recusal from the case.
Moreover, in addition to finding that there were reasonable
grounds to question the impartiality of the judge, the Oregon
Supreme Court further ruled that the judge's refusal to recuse was
misconduct in wilful violation of Canon 3C and therefore subject to
sanction. The judge's expressed avowal that he could be impartial was
not convincing to the court; notwithstanding the judge's protestations
to the contrary, the court thought that his impartiality could reason-
ably be questioned and that he should have known as much. 74 Thus,
his refusal to recuse himself was a wilful violation of Canon 3.
Under this approach, a judge's statement that he or she can main-
tain impartiality will not be accepted by a reviewing court at face
value, and if a judge's avowal of impartiality is contradicted by the
surrounding circumstances, the judge's refusal to step aside can
amount to a wilful violation of Canon 3C.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 194.
170. Id. at 195.
171. Id. at 194-95.
172. Id. at 195.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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At this point in the Schenck case, the judge argued that to discipline
him for violating Canon 3C would take him by surprise and hence
deprive him of due process of law.175 But the Oregon Supreme Court
thought otherwise. The court stated that there are objective standards
by which the judge should have realized that his impartiality was sub-
ject to reasonable question. 176 These objective standards, the court
thought, provide sufficient notice to a judge as to when recusal is
required. 177
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Schenck case is an example of a judge whose passion was misdi-
rected. This happens, probably more often than we would like, but
perhaps not more often than we should expect. Judging, after all, is a
difficult and consuming task. Making decisions about other people's
lives is a serious responsibility that engages both intellect and emo-
tion. This author believes that the judicial task of making difficult de-
cisions is advanced when judges care about the law as well as about
facts-in short, when they have a passion for life. Judicial passion,
however, must be tempered. It should not be infested with hostility,
hatred, bias, or prejudice.
Justice Holmes represents the apotheosis of the traditional concept
of judicial detachment. That sort of detachment in any human being is
extremely rare, if not impossible. Moreover, it is hardly an essential
element of judicial impartiality. As Justice Cardozo knew well, pas-
sion enriches the judicial temperament and enhances the law.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 196.
177. Id.
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